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Abstract
This paper explores the interactions between the risk of food insecurity and the
decision to health insure in the Palestinian Territories. The risk of adverse health
conditions is insurable; the risk of food insecurity is a background risk and no mar-
ket insurance exists. The vulnerability to food insecurity inuences the individual
utility from health insuring. We present a competing risk model to reveal this in-
terdependence. We specify the empirical model as a bivariate probit model and
evaluate the impact of food insecurity on the household decision to health insure.
We nd evidence of signicant complementarity between the risk of food insecurity
and the propensity to health insure. The predicted conditional probabilities reveal
that the propensity to health insure is higher in presence of food insecurity among
Palestinian households. This study shows that, in presence of a background risk,
there are complementarities among risks that policy should be mindful of.
Keywords: Food insecurity, Health insurance, Competing risks, Bivari-
ate Probit
JEL Classication: I11 015 C35
1 Introduction
The capability approach is a widely accepted paradigm in policy debates
about human development (Sen, 1985; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). There is
an emerging consensus in economics that the notion of individual well-being
goes well beyond material gains and it encompass several non-income dimen-
sions such as health, education, political freedom and democracy (Becker
et al. , 2005). Sucient access to each of these domains is a key issue of
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human well-being and enhancing economic well-being entails the designing
of system of risk protection of these domains.
Health-care systems are the social institutions that defend the right to
health. Eective and accessible health-care systems are vital to human de-
velopment because health is a vital domain of human security (Chen &
Narasimhan, 2004; King & Murray, 2002). One of the goals of an eec-
tive health-care system is to provide nancial risk protection from adverse
health conditions. The achievement of universal health insurance schemes
are recognised as the mean to attain a basic adequate standard of health
risk protection. Conict is an additional hazard to the right to health. Con-
stant exposure to threats and unsafe environments aect people perception
of risks. The Palestinian experience is a case point to this regard.
Palestinians live in state of severe insecurities and war-like conditions
since 1948. Years of political stalemate and poor governance have led the
Palestinian Territories to face serious conditions of economic insecurity, only
partially mitigated by a heavy dependence on foreign resources and interna-
tional aid. Malnutrition and food insecurity are still the most pronounced
health outcomes of such economic insecurity. These risks are interacting
with the risk to health and the consequent decision to acquire health in-
surance (i.e. to health insure). The risk of food insecurity pertains to the
environment where the individuals live and there is no economically viable
insurance market against it. Such uninsurable risks are called background
risk 1.
In this paper, we examine the interactions between the risk of food inse-
curity and the health insurance coverage. Table 1 shows the cross tabulation
of insurance coverage and food insecurity status. It reveals that the prob-
ability of being food insecure and not-insured is low, only 4.63%. On the
contrary, the probability that food insecure households are insured is 3.5
times as high. If the probability to insure was only a function of the ability
to pay for insurance poorer individuals might be expected to insure less as
1Limits for a market to insure against food insecurity risk are related to asymmetric information
problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection; the imprecision of risk assessment and the size
of the loss and the possible existence of correlated risks. Moral hazard problem relates to the fact that
incentives to prevent the occurrence of the risk would reduce, should a food insecurity insurance exists.
Also, since losses from food insecurity may be dicult to verify and quantify, claims might be overstated,
creating an ex-post moral hazard. Estimating the chances of the event "food insecurity" occurring may
be very problematic. No easily accessible historical data exist for such purpose. This unable to set
premiums and it may leave the hypothetical insurer with only the pool of bad risks (adverse selection
problem). Food insecurity entails long term consequences in health, education and personal development.
Evaluating such losses is dicult, if not impossible. Even in case of possible consequence quantication,
the size of the loss would be large. The capacity required to cover such losses for a high number of people
may be nearly impossible. Also, changes in the external environment, such as atmospheric conditions or
conict related events, may change the risk landscape radically, complicating additionally risk assessment.
Finally, food insecurity is likely to be correlated with other risks, making diversication impossible. For
all these reasons we consider food insecurity an uninsurable risk for which there exists no market solution
for insurance. There might be other ways of protection against food insecurity than buying insurance,
such as savings and forms of self-insurance. These non-market based methods are topics for further
research.
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they might be likely to substitute their expenditures for consumption.
Table 2 shows the probabilities conditional on food (in)security status.
Table 2 reports the estimates for the whole sample and the estimates for a re-
stricted sample (in brackets), excluding government employees and refugees
who have a compulsory insurance coverage2. The estimates reveal that food
insecure households are more likely to health insure. Given that a household
is food insecure, the probability to be insured is 0.75 (0.60 in the restricted
sample); a little higher than the probability to be insured given that the
household is food secure that is 0.74 (0.59 for the restricted sample). In
light of the fact that food insecure households are generally poorer, the 1%
dierence oers an interesting insight: it suggests that the attitude toward
the risk to health, and hence the decision to health insure, is aected by
the condition of food insecurity into a dierent direction than traditionally
expected3.
The presence of background risks in the environment, such as the risk of
food insecurity, aect the attitude toward other risks and the demand for
risk protection. Potentially, there might be important interactions among
the reduction of one risk and the decision to insure against other risks, es-
pecially for individuals constrained by fewer resources. This paper aims to
explore how the background risk inuences this decision. The descriptive
statistics suggests that the risk of food insecurity and buying health insur-
ance are complements and exhibit a positive correlation. This correlation
might reect separate phenomena.
First, the correlation may arise because the food insecurity risk and the
decision to insure respond to similar factors. In particular, these can be
local environment factors or individual characteristics which inuence the
perception of risk. This leads to a correlation through the observed char-
acteristics, as in Clark & Etilé (2005) who discuss behaviour interactions
between spouses through social learning about health risks.
Secondly, interdependence may be a product of household-decision mak-
ing in response to individual attitudes toward risks. The literature suggests
that an increase in background risk raises the probability to insure against
those risks that are insurable4. Measuring perceptions of increased back-
ground risks is a dicult task. This corresponds to forms of correlation in
the unobserved terms. Our empirical approach allows unobservable shocks
to be correlated.
This paper contributes to understanding economic well-being under mul-
2Section 2 outlines this condition in more details.
3This result holds also for the sample of households whose insurance coverage is voluntary as shown
by the estimates in brackets.
4This is true under the condition of risk vulnerability as explained and proved in Gollier & Pratt
(1996) and partial insurance coverage as explained in Guiso & Jappelli (1998). It has been proved that
similar eects hold whether the background risk is independent or positively correlated with the insurable
risk (see Eekhoudt & Kimball (1992)).
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tiple risks. It relates to both the literature on the eects of competing risks
to longevity as in Dow et al. (1999) and to the literature on the value of
life, in particular to those works evaluating the income elasticity of the value
of risk reduction as in Viscusi & Evans (1990) and Evans & Viscusi (1993).
These works evaluate the income elasticity of the implicit value of risk, such
as the risk of job injuries. Our paper diers because it incorporates the
eect of income in explaining the health insurance coverage in presence of
a background risk. Hence, the focus is the eect of resource endowment
and other household characteristics across risks, specically, how changes
in background sources of risk induce variation in health insurance coverage.
The theoretical framework of this paper is the theory of background risk
and the demand for insurance developed in Eekhoudt & Kimball (1992);
Eekhoudt et al. (1996). It also relates to the theory of state-dependent util-
ity, developed from the seminal contributions by Arrow (1964), Hirshleifer
(1970) and Zeckhauser (1970) and to emerging works on human security
such as King & Murray (2002).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of
the Palestinian health-care system with special emphasis on its peculiari-
ties. It also briey explains the state of food insecurity among Palestinian
households and its main causes. Section 3 presents the model used to exam-
ine how the decision to health insure changes to variations in background
risk. Section 4 discusses the data used in this study. Section 5 discusses the
econometric approach and the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Palestinian Health-Care System
The current Palestinian health-care system is a direct result of peculiar po-
litical conditions of the Palestinian Territories. Since the Oslo Accords in
1994 the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for delivering
health-care services to Palestinians. The Palestinian government sources re-
ports that MoH provides 68% of primary care delivery (MoH, 2010). Beside
the role of the MoH, there are three additional providers of health-care to
Palestinians: the UN Relief and Work Agency delivers health services and
other key services since 1948 to registered Palestinian refugees5, a number
of non-governmental organisations and the private sector. Mataria et al.
(2009) point out that the operations of these four main providers is not the
result of an ecient division of labour but it is mainly driven by the politi-
cal and economic conditions and the reaction to emergency situations. This
5The term refugees refers to people who were displaced and forcibly dispossessed during the 1948
Arab-Israeli war and their descendants. In 2008 refugees were about 34% of the Palestinian population;
6.8% of them living in camps, nowadays urban settlements, inside the occupied Palestinian Territories;
the remaining part living in urban (21.2%) or rural areas (7.0%).
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leads to a fragmented health-care system which reects contrasting priorities
and inadequate coordination of funding sources.
The health plan is based on the system inherited by the Israeli administra-
tion and imposes a compulsory health insurance for government employees.
National health plans since MoH inception have aimed to achieve universal
health insurance coverage in the Palestinian Territories. To this end, eligi-
bility was expanded and premiums were reduced. In 2000, the number of
households covered by the national insurance scheme increased signicantly
by means of waiving premium programmes, such as the decree of provision of
free insurance for victims of the Intifada and people in hardship conditions.
However, coverage is still far short of universal coverage. Our data estimate
the percentage of households uncovered by any insurance schemes is 25%.
The promotion of enrollment through reduction or waiving of premium
contributions has severely undermined the nancial viability of the Pales-
tinian health-care system. The system suers the problem of adverse selec-
tion enhanced by voluntary enrollments. Since people are allowed to enroll
at almost any time, healthy people have the incentive to stay out of the
system until they are sick6. Also, the sum of health insurance premiums
and tax revenues allocated to the MoH is insucient to meet the demand
for health services. The continuous decit of the Ministry of Health has hin-
dered investments and developments in the health-care provision, causing
quality of care to decline. This in turn contributes to eroding public trust
in government services.
The lack of capacity has resulted into an increasing number of referrals
for treatment abroad thereby contributing to the nancial burden. There
is a reported lack of coordination between the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Finance which allocates the budget to the health sector. The
centralised management structure of the public sector impairs the incentive
to provide health-care eciently and reduce accountability of hospital man-
agers. In conclusion, a substantial part of the cost of health care services in
Palestinian Territories relies on foreign donors and NGOs and out-of-pocket
spending by patients themselves. This necessarily impairs the equity of
access to health services as discussed in Abu-Zaineh et al. (2008). Health-
care payments compromises the nancial livelihood of households living in
nancial hardship or vulnerable nancial conditions. Similar problems ex-
ists elsewhere in the world, however in the Palestinian Territories they are
exacerbated by the Israel's separation policies in place.
Food insecurity is a protracted risk in the Palestinian Territories. The
World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO) report that about 25% of the Palestinian population in the West
6Schoenbaum et al. (2005) reports an interesting example of de-facto "institutionalised" adverse selec-
tion: "[...]UNRWA pays to enroll people in the government insurance program when they are diagnosed
with cancer".
Decision to Health Insure and Food Insecurity in the West Bank 6
Bank were food insecure in 2008 and most of those households are chroni-
cally food insecure. Food insecurity in the West Bank is mainly the product
of a lack of economic access to food, rather than a lack of food accessibility,
as food products are generally supplied in sucient quantity mainly through
imports. Economic accessibility to food is constrained because of articially
inated food prices due to high transportation costs, limited local food pro-
duction and heavy dependence on Israeli imports. Also, the lack of income
and earning possibilities impair household purchasing power and make them
highly sensitive to variations in prices and income shocks.
Food insecurity imposes permanent costs on lives and livelihoods of Pales-
tinians, through foregoing health and other expenditures, endangered nutri-
tional status and health conditions, which in turn aect the chances of future
income-generating opportunities. The high risk of food insecurity might af-
fect the perception of other risks to life and the demand for risk protection.
The next section proposes a theoretical model to analyse the eect of the
presence of a background risk of food insecurity on health insurance cover-
age.
3 The model
We rst abstract from the background risk and suppose that the individ-
ual preferences can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern non-
separable utility function which depends on income, U(y) > 0, and utility
is increasing in income, U 0(y) > 0. If the individual buy a health insurance,
she needs to pay an enrollment fee . The utility with insurance is U(y ).
If the individual does not buy insurance she might have to pay the cost of
hospitalisation in case of illness. Let c be the cost of health service and p the
exogenous probability of bad health status. The utility under no-insurance
is pU(y   c) + (1  p)U(y). Individuals will insure provided that the utility
with insurance exceeds the expected utility under no-insurance.
Individuals in the population are heterogenous and their decision to insure
depends on their income, risk aversion and specic tastes. In addition, a
characteristic of the environment is the presence of food insecurity risk.
This risk is a background risk and there is no economically viable insurance
market against the risk of food insecurity. This missing market adds an
additional sources of randomness to the utility function. We aim to see
whether the presence of background risk inuences the probability of buying
health insurance.
The utility function subject to a background risk is U(y; ~f). In a more
general framework it is possible to assume a human security function which
includes all risks aecting human security and it enters the Neumann-Morgenstern
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utility function7. To ease notation we assume one risk to human security,
namely ~f , the risk of food insecurity. This has support ~f 2 R+0 .
In this framework, the observed choice between to insure and not-to insure
reveals which status provides the greater utility, subject to the presence of
background risk and the budget constraint. But it is not feasible to observe
the single utilities. That is, the indirect utility is the maximum of the two
conditional indirect utility, EV insured and EV uninsured (which we abbreviate
in EV ins and EV uns respectively):
EV (y; ; p; c; ~f; x) = max[EV ins(y; ; p; ~f; x); EV uns(y; c; p; ~f; x)] (1)
s:t: C + S  Y (2)
where x are the individual characteristics and the budget constraint is made
of consumption, C, and savings, S. For simplicity we assume that S is either
equal to the price of insurance  if people decide to insure or it is zero if
people decide not to insure. This is a simplifying assumption, however it
is in line with the evidence that individual savings in the West Bank are
very low and have been exhausted by the deteriorating income-generating
opportunities (FAO-WFP, 2009).
Under these assumptions, the unobserved elements of the utility function
could be individual-specic preference factors, such as risk perception, or
specic vulnerability to risk. Following McFadden(1981) we assume an ad-
ditive separable random error for each insurance coverage state: ins in case
of insurance, uns in case of no-insurance. They decide to health insure only
if
 EV = EV
ins   EV uns > 0 (3)
where EV indicates the deterministic component of EV . To the determinis-
tic component, a stochastic component i it is added to allow for unobserved
factors of choice i (i = insured; uninsured). i is assumed to be distributed
with a standard normal distribution. The probability to insure is therefore
Pr(to Y 1 j x) = Pr(EV > 0j x) (4)
= (x0ins + ins   x0uns   uns > 0j x)
= (x0(ins   uns) > uns   insj x)
The food insecurity risk is jointly determined with this probability. How-
ever, the food insecurity risk is unobserved. From the data, we observe
the actual condition of food insecurity conditional to an arbitrary threshold
level. This imposes a bivariate structure of the probability of being health
insured and food insecure. This implies that a bivariate probit model can
7The Neumann-Morgenstern utility function will then depends on income and human security,
U(y;H(~rk)), where H(~rk) is the human security function including ~rk risks, with k = 1; ::K.
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describe the propensity to health insure in presence of a background risk of
food insecurity.
The framework we propose can be placed into the class of latent variable
models. Our model is represented as follows
y1i = 
0
1x1i + 1i (5)
y2i = 
0
2x2i + 2i (6)
f1i; 2ig  2(0; 0; 1; 1; )
where the values for y:i are unobservable and related to the following binary
dependent variables, on the basis of these conditions:
y1i = 1 if y

1i > 0; 0 otherwise; (7)
and
y2i = 1 if y

2i > 0; 0 otherwise; (8)
where y1i = 1 denotes that the individual is health insured, which depends
on personal and family characteristics, job sector and geographical attitudes
to be insured; y2i = 1 denotes that the individual is food insecure, which de-
pends on personal and family characteristics and geographical factors. The
errors (1i; 2i) are assumed to have the standard bivariate normal distri-
bution, with Cov(1i; 2i) = . There are two channels that link the two
outcomes. The rst channel is through the observable variables: if some xi
has similar eects on y1i and y2i, this induces the outcomes to be correlated.
The second channel is an unobservable link: the unobserved factors that
inuence 1i might be similar to those unobservable factors aecting 2i (e.g.
vulnerability to ill health might be similar to unobservable vulnerability to
food insecurity).
The probability of an individual to be insured and food insecure is given
as
Pr(to insure; food insecurityj x) = Pr(y1i = 1; y2i = 1j x) (9)
Pr = (X1i < x1i; X2i < x2ij x)
=
x2iZ
 1
x1iZ
 1
2(z1i; z21; )dz1i; dz2i
= (01x1i; 
0
2x2i; )
where 2 and  denote the density function and the bivariate standard nor-
mal distribution function, respectively8. Since y1i and y2i are both observed
8The model can be extended to K competing risks. Let k = 1; :::;K denote K competing risks. In
this case, the latent random variable yk > 0 for k = 1; ::;K would be the probability of being subject to
the kth particular risk. The probability of a risk cannot be observed. The available information is the
actual outcome yk = 1 if y

k > 0. In our specication we have K = 2.
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and keep full observability in terms of the four possible combinations, the
ecient estimates for the bivariate probit are provided by maximum likeli-
hood (Zellner & Lee, 1965; Ashford & Sowden, 1970; Greene, 1998). The
next section introduces the data on which we base our estimations; section
5 will discuss the estimation results.
4 Data
The data are from the Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey 2009 in
the West Bank, administered by the World Food Programme (WFP), the
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the Palestinian Cen-
tral Bureau for Statistics (PCBS) during January and February 2009. The
survey provides information about the demographic composition of 4,791
households in the West Bank, their socio-economic conditions and the food
security situation during the second half of 2008. The household sample is
random, but households with expenditure below the 1st percentile or above
the 99th percentile have been dropped.
Food insecurity is a multidimensional phenomenon. The Rome Declara-
tion on World Food Security (1996) and the World Food Summit Plan of
Action dene that food security exists when "all people, at all times, have
physical and economic access to sucient, safe and nutritious food to meet
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life". The
denition includes four main components: (i) adequacy of food supply or
availability; (ii) stability of supply, without uctuations or shortages from
season to season or from year to year; (iii) accessibility to food or aordabil-
ity; (iv) quality and safety of food.
Capturing the food insecurity risk by statistical indicators is complicated
and there is not a universally accepted indicator. Like all indicators reect-
ing multidimensional phenomena, there exists a trade-o between synthesis
and comprehensiveness in each feasible indicator. In addition, perception-
based versus standardised scale indicators often give dierent pictures. Fur-
thermore, indicators are context dependent. Overlooking the context might
suggest misleading implications. A common indicator of food insecurity, for
instance, is the number of calories consumed per day based on consumed
quantity of food. When this is possible to compute, this indicator oers
a precise and comparable measure of calory intake. However, the indica-
tor tends to increase when food is externally provided by food-aid agencies.
Despite condition (i) and (iv) above might be met in this situation, sup-
ply is not stable and the condition is not self-sustainable. The risk of food
insecurity remains high in such a situation.
The literature has provided various indicators. Each of them capture
dierent aspects of food insecurity. From the survey, we have been able to
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compute a number of alternative food insecurity indicators. These include:
the Household Food Insecurity Access Prevalence, the number of meals per
children per day, the number of meals per adult per day, the food insecurity
indicator proposed by FAO within the framework of the Socio-Economic and
Food Security Monitoring System in the West Bank.
The Household Food Insecurity Access Prevalence (HFIA) is based on
the frequency of occurrence of certain consequences which result from an
insucient availability of food (such as running out of food, going to bed
hungry, going a whole day and night without eating) and/or household anx-
iety whether the food is sucient to meet basic needs9. Households are
categorised in four levels of food insecurity as they experience those con-
ditions more frequently. These level categorisations generate a categorical
variable, HFIA, coded as follows: 1 = Food secure; 2 = Mildly food insecure;
3 = Moderately food insecure; 4 = Severely food insecure. We also create
a dichotomous food insecurity indicator based on the same categorisation.
This binary variable is equal to 1 if the household falls into the "severely
food insecure" category, 0 otherwise.
The frequency of meals is the number of meals eaten per days. Two sepa-
rate indicators are computed: one refers to meals eaten by children and the
second to meals consumed by adults. Both indicators range from a mini-
mum value of 1 to a maximum of 5 meals per day. In the empirical analysis
that follows, these indicators are reversed to make them consistent with the
other food insecurity indicators. Hence, the highest value is associated with
the most severe condition of food insecurity.
The food insecurity indicator proposed by FAO classies households in
four category according to their consumption and income levels. The cate-
gorical indicator we use is the FAO indicator recoded as follow: Food secure
household = 1; Marginally food secure = 2; Vulnerable (to food insecurity)
= 3; Food insecure = 4. The detailed procedure and the methodology for
this indicator are available on www.apis.ps and FAO (2009).
To capture the risk of food insecurity, our preferred indicator is the HFIA
indicator. This is because the indicator includes a measure of household
anxiety regarding the availability of food which is direct reection of the
perception of the risk of food insecurity. The analysis in the next section
is based on the HFIA indicator. Results using alternative indicators are
presented in Table 4 and commented on the text. Control variables and
coding details are summarised in Appendix 1.
9The indicator is created following the guidelines in Coates et al. (2007). A discussion about the
validity of food insecurity indicators based on self-reported behaviours and perceptions can be found in
Coates et al. (2007) and Webb et al. (2006).
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5 Empirical results
This section discusses the estimates of the bivariate probit model in equa-
tions (5) and (6), reported reported in Table 3. In the reduced form, the
probability of food insecurity and the probability of being health insured are
functions of only exogenous variables. The vector of exogenous covariates xki
is a vector of household characteristics including income, educational level,
whether the household is female-headed and refugee status. The choice to
insure might be inuenced by learning about health risks: we control for this
by including a variable indicating whether the households faced any severe
health problems in the last 6 months. We also control for the location of
residence, employment sector (private sector, government employee, foreign
government employee or charity organisation10) and the ownership of a crop
cultivated eld. In addition, we include a series of governorate dummies to
take into account the importance of area-eects.
Column (2) in Table 3 reports the coecient estimates for the health in-
surance equation. Column (3) reports the estimates for the food insecurity
equation based on the HFIA indicator. The residual correlation while not
large (0.087) is statistically dierent from zero11. The t-ratio on this coe-
cient is 2.4 and LR test statistics for the hypothesis that the two equations
are independent is 6.0 with p-value 0.014: this suggests that there is a sig-
nicant degree of interdependence between the two equations which creates
some form of correlation between the residuals. The positive correlation in-
dicates that households that experience more food insecurity than the model
predicts, are also more likely to be health insured. This is consistent with
the theoretical literature on background risk: increases in the uninsurable
risk raises the probability to insure against the insurable risk12.
Table 4 presents the results computed with a number of alternative food
insecurity indicators. The indicator based on the number of meals per adult
and the FAO indicator lead to the same conclusion. The correlation with the
former indicator is equals to 0.086; however this estimates is not signicant
at conventional level. Food insecurity measured by the FAO indicator leads
to a signicant correlation equals to 0.10. The indicator based on the num-
ber of meals per children reports a small negative correlation, statistically
insignicant. The range of the correlations is approximately similar across
10We do not control for employees in international organisations as there are not enough observations
in the sample to provide ecient estimates.
11When  is not equal to zero, Zellner & Lee (1965) have shown that estimating the two equations
jointly yields more ecient estimates than a single equation approach. Provided the two outcomes are
fully observable, it is always possible to estimate the two probit equations separately. This imposes the
correlation to be equal to zero.
12Due to the existence of compulsory health insurance scheme for some category of employees, the
health insurance coverage does not necessarily reect a voluntary choice. This is the case of government
employee for example. Since we cannot observed whether the decision to insure is voluntary or not for
other sector employees, it is not straightforward whether the health insurance equation in this paper
should be interpreted as a demand or a supply equation.
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all indicators and it is in line with the results from Table 3.
The revealed correlations between the health insurance equation and the
food insecurity equation might be interpreted in term of food insecurity being
predetermined to the decision to health insure13. This leads to a recursive
simultaneous-equation probit model. We estimate such model for various
indicators of food insecurity. These estimates are shown in Table 5. Two
indicators based on the Households Food Insecurity Access Prevalence and
the FAO indicator are positively associated with the decision to health insure
and statistically signicant. This conrms the complementarity revealed by
our analysis. Two indicators based on the number of meals consumed have
small insignicant coecients.
To detect how the propensity to health insure changes in presence of
food insecurity, we predict conditional probabilities for a number of house-
hold categories, based on the estimates in Table 3. These estimates are
shown in Table 6. Column(2) and (3) in Table 6 present conditional proba-
bilities of being health insured given that the household is classied as food
insecure, that is Pr(y1 = 1jy2 = 1) in the system (5) and (6). Column (4)
and (5) present conditional probabilities for health insurance coverage given
the household is food secure, that is Pr(y1 = 1jy2 = 0). We dierentiate
among households with refugee and non-refugee status. Columns (2) and (4)
refer to non-refugee households while columns (3) and (5) refer to refugee
households. The probabilities are computed for a representative household
with average income of her own category, which is male-headed unless spec-
ied, with a post-secondary school diploma, no serious disease in the past
had occurred and the household lives in a urban neighbourhood of Ramal-
lah governorate and owns no crop eld. The Table reports the conditional
probabilities for dierent employment categories, location of residence, oc-
currence of diseases in the past and female versus male-headed households.
In presence of food insecurity, the probabilities of being health insured
among non-refugees are higher for all employment sector categories. These
are highlighted in bold. A food insecure private sector employee has a pre-
dicted probability to health insure equal to 0.49 while the probability falls
to 0.14 for a food secure employee with otherwise the same characteristics.
Other employment categories share the same trend. Due to the existence
of compulsory insurance scheme for government employees, the predicted
probability of being health insured is as high as 0.93 for a food insecure
households and 0.59 for, other things equal, a food secure household. A
foreign government employee has 0.48 probability of health insure, while a
charity sector employees has 0.56 if at risk of food insecurity. Probabilities
are smaller under food security conditions.
13Food insecurity being predetermined to the decision to health insure is a suggested interpretation
that unfortunately cannot be veried with the data available. Should more detailed data and follow-up
surveys over time be available, this issue could be investigated and tested.
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Such estimates also show that employment sector is an important deter-
minant to shape the pattern of health insurance coverage among households.
This reects the issue of an involuntary decision to health insurance which we
cannot directly observe from the data. For example, government employees
are subject to a compulsory Palestinian Authority health insurance which
explains the high value of the predictive probabilities for such category. To
the same token, refugees are provided with free-of-charge UNRWA health
insurance which explains why refugees have probability of health insuring
higher than 0.90 on average, as it appears in column (3).
Table 6 shows that rural dwellers who are food insecure are more likely to
be covered by insurance than urban dwellers: the former have a probability
to insure of 0.74 while urban dwellers have a probability of 0.70. However the
pattern is reversed if they are food secure: food secure rural dwellers insure
with a probability of 0.21 while urban dwellers with a probability of 0.30.
Food insecure female-headed households have a lower probability to health
insure (0.65) than comparable male-headed households (0.70), however they
are less likely to be food insecure in general14.
Having experience some forms of disease in the past six months raises
the probability of being health insured remarkably: the probability of being
health insured for a private employee having experienced two forms of disease
in the past increases from 0.49 to 0.59; for a government employee it increases
from 0.93 to 0.9615. The inuence induced by the occurrence of a past
disease diminishes when conditioning on food security. In this situation, the
conditional probabilities with a disease having occurred and the conditional
probabilities with no disease been experienced are very similar: a private
employee with two past diseases has a probability to health insure equals to
0.14, the same as a private employee with no past disease. A government
employee with past diseases has a probability to insure of 0.53, slightly lower
than the same individual with no disease (0.59).
In conclusion, food secure households are on average less likely to health
insure than food insecure households. Table 7 presents the odds ratios for
the household characteristics discussed in the previous paragraphes. Gov-
ernment employees have the highest probability to insure among dierent
job sectors in both food (in)security conditions and foreign sector employees
the least probability. Conditioning on food insecurity raises the probabilities
to insure of all employment sectors: the probability that a private employee
insures if food insecure is 3.5 times higher than the probability that the
same individual insures if she is food secure. A food insecure government
14The marginal probability of being food insecure for a female-headed household is 0.14; for a male-
headed household is 0.20. Marginal probabilities of health-insurance coverage and food insecurity for a
number of household characteristics are shown in Appendix 2.
15The nature of the data do not allow to distinguish whether the insurance scheme was adopted only
after the disease or it was in place before. However, cases of taking up a government insurance just before
a needed hospitalisation service are not unusual in the West Bank.
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employee is 1.6 time more likely to insure than her food secure colleague. A
foreign sector employee is the less likely to insure among all job sectors, but
if she is food insecure, she will be 4.8 times more likely to health-insure.
6 Conclusions
This paper explores the interactions between the risk of food insecurity and
the decision to health insure in the West Bank. The risk of food insecurity
is an uninsurable risk since no economically viable market for insurance ex-
ists against this risk. The vulnerability to the background risk inuences
the individual utility from health insuring. We nd empirical evidence of
behavioural cross-risk eects. The interdependence between the risk of food
insecurity and the decision to health insure has modest size (0.087) and it is
statistically dierent from zero. The positive correlation suggests that the
increases in the background risk raises the probability to buy a health insur-
ance. The predicted conditional probabilities reveal that the propensity to
health insure is higher in presence of food insecurity than without. The es-
timates show that employment sector is an important determinant to shape
the pattern of likelihood to health insure among Palestinian households.
This study suggests that there is a signicant degree of complementarity
between food insecurity risk and the decision to insure against the risk to
health. We nd evidence of a cross-risk spillover eect between the risk of
food insecurity, its perception and the sense of deprivation that is likely to
arise from this condition and the propensity to buy health insurance. This
means that changes in the vulnerability to food insecurity might induce
changes in how the risk to health is perceived. The revealed complementar-
ity suggests that a particular policy that decreases the probability of food
insecurity also diminishes the propensity to health insure.
Our evidence suggests that the presence of background risks alters the
incentives to invest in health protection. It is important that policy mak-
ers are aware of this incentive structure. However, it is dicult to identify
the structure of causality, hence policy recommendations are not clear-cut.
The revealed complementarity suggests that food aid policies that improves
household food security conditions may reduce the propensity to health
insure. A larger quota of people less inclined to insure in presence of a
health insurance system which itself is not eective (e.g. because of pre-
mium waivers programmes) might create important welfare costs, problems
of nancial viability of the health-care system and consequent ineciencies
(e.g inequity of access and quality deterioration). Welfare improving policies
targeted to erase household vulnerability to food insecurity should include
elements aimed to counterbalance the negative incentive to the propensity
to health insure outlined in this analysis.
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We did not consider empirically other background risks and specic causes
of human insecurity, such as violence from conict. Identifying the inherent
complementarities is an important question to inform policy interventions
about how the structure of incentive to health protect is altered, albeit in-
directly, and which is the direction and the magnitude of these incentive
spillovers. Further analysis on multiple background risks and their interac-
tions with the risk to health is warranted and it is a topic for future research.
Decision to Health Insure and Food Insecurity in the West Bank 16
References
Abu-Zaineh, M., Mataria, A., Luchini, S., & Moatti, J.P. 2008. Equity in
health care nancing in the Palestinian context: the value-added of the
disaggregated approach. Social Science and Medicine, 66(11), 230820.
Arrow, K. J. 1964. The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of
Risk-bearing. The Review of Economic Studies, 31(2), 9196.
Ashford, J.R., & Sowden, R.R. 1970. Multivariate probit analysis.
Biometrika, 26, 535546.
Becker, Gary S., Philipson, Tomas J., & Soares, Rodrigo R. 2005. The Quan-
tity and Quality of Life and the Evolution of World Inequality. American
Economic Review, 95(1), 277291.
Chen, L., & Narasimhan, V. 2004. Global Health versus Human Security.
Pages 183189 of: Chen, L. (ed), Global Health Challenge for Human
Security. Harvard University Press, Boston.
Clark, Andrew E., & Etilé, Fabrice. 2005. Don't Give Up On Me Baby:
Spousal Correlation in Smoking Behaviour. IZA Discussion Papers 1692.
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Coates, J., Swindale, A., & Bilinsky, P. 2007. Household Food Insecurity
Access Scale (HFIAS) for Measuring of Food Access: Indicator Guide.
Tech. rept. Version 3. Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance - USAID.
Dow, W. H., Philipson, Thomas, & Sala-i Martin, Xavier. 1999. Longevity
Complementarities under Competing Risks. American Economic Review,
89(5), 13581371.
Eekhoudt, Louis, & Kimball, Miles. 1992. Background risk, prudence and the
demand for insurance. Chap. part II, pages 239254 of: Dionne, G. (ed),
Contributions to Insurance Economics. Kluwer Academic Press, London.
Eekhoudt, Louis, Gollier, Christian, & Schlesinger, Harris. 1996. Changes in
Background Risk and Risk Taking Behavior. Econometrica, 64(3), 683
689.
Evans, William N., & Viscusi, W. Kip. 1993. Income Eects and the Value
of Health. The Journal of Human Resources, 28(3), 497518.
FAO. 2009. Household Food Security Proling in West Bank. Tech. rept.
Working Paper Series 2009. World Food Programme and Food and Agri-
colture Organisation.
Gollier, Christian, & Pratt, John. 1996. Risk Vulnerability and the Temper-
ing Eect of Background Risk. Econometrica, 64(5), 11091123.
Decision to Health Insure and Food Insecurity in the West Bank 17
Greene, William H. 1998. Gender Economics Courses in Liberal Arts Col-
leges: Further Results. The Journal of Economic Education, 29(4), 291
300.
Guiso, Luigi, & Jappelli, Tullio. 1998. Background Uncertainty and the
Demand for Insurance Against Insurable Risks. The GENEVA Papers on
Risk and Insurance - Theory, 23(1), 727.
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1970. Investment, Interest and Capital. Englewood Clis,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
King, Gary, & Murray, Christopher J. 2002. Rethinking Human Security.
Political Science Quarterly, 116.
Mataria, A., Khatib R. Donaldson C. Bossert T., Hunter, DJ., Alsayed, F.,
& Moatti, JP. 2009. The health-care system: an assessment and reform
agenda. The Lancet, 373(9670), 12071217.
MoH. 2010. Health status in Palestine 2009. Tech. rept. Health Annual
Report. Palestinian Health Information Center, Ministry of Health.
Nussbaum, Martha C., & Sen, Amartya. 1993. The Quality of Life. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Schoenbaum, M., A, AK., & Deckelbaum, RJ. 2005. Strengthening the
Palestinian health system. RAND Corporation.
Sen, Amartya. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Viscusi, W Kip, & Evans, William N. 1990. Utility Functions That De-
pend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications. American
Economic Review, 80(3), 35374.
Webb, P., Coates, J., Frongillo, E. A., Rogers, B. L., Swindale, A., & Bilin-
sky, P. 2006. Measuring Household Food Insecurity: Why It's So Impor-
tant and Yet So Dicult to Do. Supplement to The Journal of Nutrition,
5(136), 14041408.
Zeckhauser, Richard. 1970. Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeo
between risk spreading and appropriate incentives. Journal of Economic
Theory, 2(1), 1026.
Zellner, Arnold, & Lee, Tong Hun. 1965. Joint Estimation of Relationships
Involving Discrete Random Variables. Econometrica, 33(2), 382394.
Decision to Health Insure and Food Insecurity in the West Bank 18
APPENDIX 1.
Table 1.1: Data and variable descriptions
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION RANGE NOTES
Dependent
variables
y1i Health-insurance coverage Dichotomous variable, where 1 indicates the
household is health-insured, 0 if not health-
insured
y2i Food Insecurity indicator
HFIA Household Food Insecurity Access
Prevalence
Indicator from 1 to 4, where 1 is "food secure"
and 4 is "severely food insecure". The indica-
tor is summarised as a dichotomous variable
equals to 1 if HFIA is 4, 0 otherwise
meal child Frequency of meals eaten by chil-
dren per day
Indicator from 1 to 5. The indicator is sum-
marised as a dichotomous variable equals to
1 if kids eat less than 2 meals per day, 0 oth-
erwise
meal adult < 1 Frequency of meals eaten by
adults per day
Indicator from 1 to 5. The indicator is sum-
marised as a dichotomous variable equals to
1 if adults eat less than 1 meals per day, 0
otherwise
meal adult < 2 Frequency of meals eaten by
adults per day
Indicator from 1 to 5. The indicator is sum-
marised as a dichotomous variable equals to
1 if adults eat less than 2 meals per day, 0
otherwise
FAO FAO elaborated indicator The indicator is based on income and goes
from 1 to 4. It is recoded such that 1 is "food
secure" and 4 is "food insecure". The indica-
tor is summarised as a dichotomous variable
equals to 1 if "food insecure", 0 otherwise
FAO
source
Control
variables
income Household monthly expenditure in logarithm scale
educ level Educational level From 1 to 10. 1 (illiterate) until 10 (PhD)
fem head Female-headed household Dichotomous variable: 1 if female-headed
household, 0 if male-headed
refugee Refugee status Dichotomous variable: 1 if household-head is
a registered refugee, 0 otherwise
disease Use of health services in the last
6 months
From 0 to 8. 0 (no need of health service)
until 8 (8 dierent health services used)
urban Urban dweller Dichotomous variable: 1 if household live in
urban areas, 0 otherwise
rural Rural dweller Dichotomous variable: 1 if household live in
rural areas, 0 otherwise
private Private sector employee Dichotomous variable: 1 if household-head is
employed in the private sector, 0 otherwise
government Government sector employee Dichotomous variable: 1 if household-head is
employed in the gov. sector, 0 otherwise
foreign Employee by a foreign gov. Dichotomous variable: 1 if household-head is
employed by a foreign government, 0 other-
wise
charity Employee by a charity/NGO Dichotomous variable: 1 if household-head is
employed by a charity/NGO, 0 otherwise
crop Ownership of crop-cultivated eld Dichotomous variable: 1 if household owns a
crop-cultivated eld, 0 otherwise
Macro
xed
eects
gov# Governorate xed eect 12 dummy variables
Notes: `'FAO stands for Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
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APPENDIX 2.
Table 2.1: Predicted Marginal Probabilities of Health Insurance and Food Insecurity by
household category.
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Pr(Health insured) Pr(Food Insecurity)
Characteristics Pr(y1 = 1) Pr(y2 = 1)
Non-refugee Refugee Non-refugee Refugee
private 0.44 0.91 0.20 0.23
government 0.91 0.99 0.16 0.19
foreign 0.44 0.90 0.22 0.25
charity 0.50 0.93 0.07 0.08
female headed 0.38 0.14
male headed 0.44 0.20
rural 0.50 0.27
urban 0.44 0.20
disease : no 0.44 0.20
disease : yes 0.54 0.25
land : no 0.50 0.27
land : yes 0.52 0.23
Note:  imposes working in the private sector.
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Table 1: Joint Probabilities.
Not-insured Insured
Food secure 20.6 60.7 81.3
[32.5] [48.1] [80.6]
Food insecure 4.6 14.1 18.7
[7.6] [11.8] [19.4]
25.2 74.8
[40.1] [59.9]
Notes: Figures are in percentages. Estimates in brackets are
from the restricted sample, excluding government employees
and refugees.
Table 2: Conditional Probabilities.
Conditioning Not-insured Insured
Food secure 0.25 0.74
[0.40] [0.59]
Food insecure 0.24 0.75
[0.39] [0.60]
Notes: Estimates in brackets are from the re-
stricted sample, excluding government employees
and refugees.
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Table 3: Bivariate Probit estimates of Health Insurance coverage and Food Insecurity
risk.
(2) (3)
Dependent variable Insurance Food Insecurity
Pr(y1 = 1) Pr(y2 = 1)
income 0.038 -0.293 ***
(0.042) (0.039)
educ level 0.020 -0.081 ***
(0.015) (0.014)
fem head -0.165 * -0.234 ***
(0.092) (0.083)
refugee 1.477 *** 0.11 **
(0.075) (0.053)
disease 0.118 *** 0.08 ***
(0.020) (0.017)
urban -0.703 *** -0.031
(0.235) (0.095)
rural -0.559 ** 0.203 **
(0.239) (0.103)
private -0.544 *** -0.022
(0.07) (0.061)
government 0.969 *** -0.154
(0.141) (0.098)
foreign -0.558 ** 0.061
(0.260) (0.251)
charity -0.405 -0.647
(0.427) (0.537)
crop 0.055 -0.121 **
(0.058) (0.060)
const 3.21 *** 1.195 ***
(0.549) (0.342)
N 4598
MLL -3905.9
 0.087**
(0.035)
LR test 6.00 p-value = 0.014
Notes: Government xed eects are included but not reported.  is
the correlation parameter. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The
dependent variables are y1 = 1 if the household head is health in-
sured, 0 otherwise; y2 = 1 if the household is classied as `'severely
food insecure according to HFIA criteria described in section 4
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Table 5: Health Insurance coverage with predetermined food insecurity- Probit estimates
with Governorate xed eects
Dep var: Health Insurance Pr(y1i = 1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
income 0.049 0.053 0.031 0.105** 0.037
(0.042) (0.042) (0.050) (0.045) (0.042)
educ level 0.022 0.026* 0.008 0.026* 0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
fem head -0.157* -0.153* 0.188 -0.117 -0.165*
(0.092) (0.092) (0.153) (0.093) (0.092)
refugee 1.475*** 1.471*** 1.576*** 1.469*** 1.472***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.094) (0.076) (0.075)
disease 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.099*** 0.115*** 0.118***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
urban -0.703*** -0.700*** -0.499** -0.707*** -0.717***
(0.235) (0.236) (0.250) (0.236) (0.235)
rural -0.568** -0.567** -0.370 -0.581** -0.571**
(0.239) (0.240) (0.255) (0.240) (0.239)
private -0.543*** -0.549*** -0.455*** -0.536*** -0.542***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.097) (0.070) (0.070)
government 0.974*** 0.970*** 1.059*** 0.989*** 0.967***
(0.141) (0.142) (0.163) (0.142) (0.141)
foreign -0.563** -0.581** -0.627** -0.566** -0.551**
(0.260) (0.260) (0.284) (0.260) (0.260)
charity -0.395 -0.393 -0.153 -0.379 -0.408
(0.426) (0.426) (0.548) (0.430) (0.426)
crop 0.060 0.060 0.000 0.054 0.057
(0.058) (0.058) (0.067) (0.058) (0.058)
HFIA1 0.140**
(0.062)
HFIA2 0.059***
(0.021)
meal child3 -0.011
(0.045)
FAO 0.091***
(0.023)
meal adult3 -0.000
(0.042)
N 4598 4598 3424 4597 4597
pseudo R2 0.287 0.288 0.291 0.289 0.286
MLL -1852.9 -1851.4 -1375.5 -1847.3 -1855.4
Notes: [1] HFIA dichotomous indicator: y2i = 1 if severe food insecure. [2] Food Insecurity ordinal
indicator: y2i goes from 1 to 4, where 4 is the severe food insecurity; [3] Indicator based on number
of meals eaten per day by children (adult). The indicator is reversed for consistency: it goes from 1
to 5 where 5 is severe food insecurity. Governorate xed eects and a constant are included but not
reported.
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Table 7: Predicted Odds Ratios by Household characteristics
Non-refugee Refugee
Characteristics Pr(y1=1jy2=1)Pr(y1=1jy2=0)
Pr(y1=1jy2=1)
Pr(y1=1jy2=0)
private 3.5 2.0
government 1.6 1.6
foreign 4.8 2.2
charity 1.4 1.3
urban(male-headed) 2.3 1.9
rural 3.5 2.8
rural (in private sector) 6.8 2.8
rural (in government) 1.6 2.1
disease 2.8 2.5
disease (in private sector) 4.2 2.4
disease (in government) 1.8 1.9
female-headed 1.9 1.5
Notes: Predicted odds ratios are the ratio of the conditional probability
of a positive outcome when the conditioning variable is active to the con-
ditional probability of positive outcome when the conditioning variable is
inactive.
 indicates that the eect of employment sector has been omitted.
